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This Synthesis Report for the FESSUD project is Deliverable 6.10. It synthesizes the results of six 
Working Papers that have been part of Deliverable 6.07. These Working Papers have covered the 
major Emerging Economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. Though 
there were many illustrative tables and graphs in these Working Papers, we refrain from including 
them in this Synthesis Report. For more detail, readers can refer to the Working Papers 
themselves. 
The ensuing text does not follow the numbering of the Working Papers. It begins with the Working 
Paper that sought to evaluate the impact on India of changes in the global financial and monetary 
system.  This basic approach will be emulated in the summary of the other five Working Papers 
that are part of this Deliverable. At the end, this Synthesis Report will provide a general summary 
of the main trends and their implications. 
I. Working Paper #145. “The Impact of Changes in the Global 
Financial and Monetary System on India” by P. Mukhopadhyay 
 
I. Introduction 
Working Paper #145 (Mukhopadhyay 2016) has focused on the impact of financialisation in India 
and drawn its results through analysing both an international data set of macroeconomic variables 
and a country-level dataset for India itself. It also utilizes firm-level data in order to examine the 
impact of financial liberalisation on firms of different categories. 
One of the major points from its analysis of firm-level data suggests that a significant share of the 
increase in the level of credit to industries over recent years has been used for financial investment 
and the holding of inventories rather than for productive investment. 
The paper also utilizes the CAM global macro model to do medium-term projections for the Indian 
economy. In this respect, it is similar to the Working Papers that have focused on China (Working 
Paper #144) and on Brazil and Indonesia (Working Paper #141). The projections for India point to a 
major policy lesson, namely, that if the country wishes to continue its relatively high rate of 
economic growth until 2030, it needs to increase aggregate demand both domestically and 
through an export push.  
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The main engine of increases in domestic demand would be private investment and support for an 
export push that would involve real exchange rate devaluation. At the same time, however, the 
author of this Working Paper warns that opening up India’s capital account would very likely lead 
to a build-up of unstable external portfolio liabilities. This is a concern that this Working Paper 
shares, in particular, with Working Paper #141 for Brazil and Indonesia. 
II. Trends in India’s Economy 
The paper starts by presenting a review of trends in the Indian economy from 1970 to 2013. 
Thereafter it supplements this review with projections generated by the CAM global macro-
econometric model for the period between 2015 and 2030.  
According to PPP estimates of GDP, India has already emerged as the third largest economy in the 
world, after China and the USA. But the central concern for Working Paper #145 is whether India 
can continue growing at a relatively high rate in the future if its economy becomes increasingly 
‘financialised’. Such a potentially adverse trend would imply, for instance, that India’s firms would 
increasingly rely on investment in the financial sector instead of investment in manufacturing. 
The share of external financial assets held by India has remained relatively modest. In 1990 it 
accounted for only 0.08% of all such assets at the global level. By 2013 this share had risen to only 
0.37%. According to current trends, India’s share would reach about 1% of the total by 2030.  
This modest trend contrasts sharply, for instance, with the trend in China: by 2030 this country 
would hold 11.6% of all external financial assets. Hence, India is not expected to amass sizeable 
foreign financial assets, including foreign-exchange reserves, as an effective hedge against the 
instability of inward foreign financial investment in the country. 
Between 1993 and 2004, India experienced current-account surpluses. But since that period, it has 
suffered from recurrent current-account deficits. Thus, there has been a secular increase in India’s 
net external liabilities as a result of having to finance such deficits. 
Within this overall trend, the share of India’s total external liabilities that are represented by 
relatively unstable short-term portfolio liabilities remained around 23% between 1990 and 2013, 
but it is projected to rise to 31% by 2030. By contrast, China’s projected share would remain much 
lower, namely, at about 8%. So India is likely in the future to remain vulnerable to the instability of 
global financial forces. 
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This Working Paper is particularly concerned about the relationship between India’s rate of 
economic growth and the growth of its financial sector. Before 1990 banks in India were generally 
publicly owned and controlled. But since that time, private banks as well as foreign private banks 
have been allowed to enter the country’s financial sector.  
Regressions on the Financial Sector and Economic Growth 
One of the central issues for this Working Paper is whether the provision of credit under the 
current conditions of the Indian banking sector is having a positive effect on economic growth. In 
order to draw inferences on this connection, the paper runs a number of statistical regressions.  
For example, it compares conditions during the pre-reform period, i.e., between 1971 and 1990, 
with those in the post-reform period since 1990. The relevant question for such regressions is 
whether the entry of foreign and private banks into India’s financial sector has enhanced 
competition and efficiency, and has thus spurred faster economic growth. 
The Working Paper’s initial regression results at the state level suggest that the impact of credit on 
economic growth has indeed been positive and more pronounced in the post-reform period. 
The Working Paper also carried out regressions at the state level across the three major sectors of 
the Indian economy, namely, industry, services and agriculture. While there appears to be a 
positive relationship between the additional provision of credit and growth in the agricultural and 
services sectors, in industry there appears to be a negative relationship.  
This is a troubling result since industry—and manufacturing in particular—needs to play an 
increasingly important role in the Indian economy. Moreover, in this regression analysis all of the 
values of the elasticities of growth with respect to credit were less than one. Namely, the 
relationships were inelastic: economic growth responded less than proportionately to increases in 
credit. 
Over time there has indeed been a significant growth in credit measured as a ratio to GDP in India. 
In 1969, for example, this ratio was a mere 1%. But by 2012 it had risen to 88%. Similarly, credit as 
a percentage of gross capital formation had risen by 2012 to 200%. But this Working Paper argues 
that a significant share of this credit has been deployed for financial investments and inventory 
stock-piling instead of for expanding the stock of fixed productive assets. Specifically, financial 
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investments represent the expenditures of firms on buying assets such as shares, debentures, 
bonds and mutual funds. 
In India banks have remained the chief financiers of firms’ investment. In other words, the country 
has remained a debt-driven economy. But a crucial issue is whether in incurring such debt, firms 
have invested in physical capital or financial assets. 
Regressions on Borrowing and Investments 
In examining such issues, this Working Paper carries out regressions on the relationship between 
borrowing and investment in physical assets. Its results suggest that the resultant mean 
expenditures on physical investment have been much smaller than the mean expenditures on 
either financial investment or the holdings of inventories. 
These results raise some major concerns. On the one hand, if investment in financial markets is 
greater than investment in physical assets, this result implies that the rate of return on financial 
investment is likely to be higher than that for productive investment. Unfortunately, this is a 
barometer of increased ‘financialisation’ of an economy and its potentially negative effects would 
need to be monitored carefully.  
On the other hand, if investment in inventories exceeds investment in productive assets, this 
outcome could be a barometer of ‘over-production’, leading, in other words, to a piling up of 
unused inventories. Namely, the demand for goods and services across the Indian economy could 
be adversely affected by financialisation. This phenomenon could be characterised as induced 
‘under-consumption’. 
An additional policy concern is that the current Indian government is making a major effort to limit 
its fiscal deficit. The current target, for example, is to contain the fiscal deficit within a maximum of 
-4% of GDP by constraining government expenditures. But if such a policy option is followed over 
an extended period, the financing of public investment and social expenditures could be adversely 
affected. This outcome would represent an additional brake on the expansion of aggregate 
demand. 
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III. Macro Modeling of Policy Options for the Indian Economy 
The issues above raise important concerns about how India can be expected in the future to 
continue maintaining relatively high rates of economic growth within the constraining context of 
‘under-consumption’.  
In order to address such concerns, the authors of the Working Paper utilize the CAM global model 
to test the effects of a more progressive package of policy options over the medium term, i.e., until 
2030. The results of such an alternative projection can then be compared to those for the ‘baseline’ 
projection, which would continue current demand-retarding government policies. 
The alternative policy scenario devised by the authors is based essentially on increasing domestic 
demand and supporting an export push. In order to avoid inflationary pressures, however, 
increases in demand in this scenario are adjusted in order to constrain the growth of GDP to be less 
than 8%.  
Also, the alternative scenario accepts the general thrust of the government’s intention to limit its 
fiscal deficit. This leads to a reduction of the Net Lending of the Government to about -4% of GDP. 
As a result, there would be secular decline in India’s Government debt as a ratio to GDP. 
The leading initiative used to boost domestic demand in this scenario is providing incentives to 
expand private investment. Note that this expansion does not apply to public investment. This 
macroeconomic programme is also based on allowing a greater degree of foreign investment 
(relying primarily, it is hoped, on increases in productive Foreign Direct Investment).  
One of the major constraints on India’s current account is that it is obliged to be a major importer 
of oil. Hence, in order to support an export push and help contain the country’s current account 
deficit within -2% of GDP, the alternative policy scenario posits depreciation of the real exchange 
rate along with the promotion of non-carbon energy production. The latter initiative is based in 
part, for example, on making India’s public transport system more environmentally friendly. 
This alternative scenario also posits an increase in India’s exports of manufactured goods as a 
necessary foundation for maintaining relatively high rates of economic growth over the medium 
term. As a result, the share of India’s exports of manufactured goods in total global exports would 
rise from 2% to about 3% over the medium term. 
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IV. Projected Constraints on Future Economic Growth 
India is projected to benefit in the future from the continuance of relatively low oil prices (in 
contrast to the previous prolonged boom in prices). This future trend should help to contain 
inflation and constrain the widening of the country’s trade deficit. However, as India’s income per 
capita continues to rise over the medium term, there would be a concomitant greater demand for 
energy.  
In addition, the country’s projected continued reliance on coal for electricity and petroleum for 
transport would likely have adverse environmental impacts. Hence, the country will not be able to 
escape the problem of facing some degree of trade-off between rapid economic growth and 
promoting environmental sustainability. 
This Working Paper’s progressive policy scenario would also face other significant constraints over 
the medium term. There is a projected small drop in public investment, for example, which would 
certainly have a counter-productive effect. Public investment should be playing, in contrast, a 
more expansive role as well as helping to stimulate greater private investment. 
In addition, the projected greater opening of India’s capital account to foreign investment would 
lead to a sharp increase in short-term unstable inward portfolio investment. For example, as a 
proportion of total external financial liabilities, portfolio investment would rise from 25% to 32% 
between 2015 and 2030.  
As is shown in the Working Papers on Brazil and Indonesia (to be discussed later), the rise of such 
inward portfolio investment would increase India’s vulnerabilities to the vagaries of international 
financial flows. For example, the Net External Asset Positions of both Brazil and Indonesia have 
been decidedly negative, based, unfortunately, on an increasing share of portfolio investment and 
other short-term financial investment in its total external liabilities.  
In 2015 Brazil’s Net External Asset Position represented about -50% of GDP and Indonesia’s 
corresponding ratio was more than -60%. While India’s Net External Asset Position in 2015 was 
about +15% of GDP, this ratio would likely turn negative over the projected period based even on 
the relatively positive projected trends in the alternative policy scenario. Hence, India could face 
future financial instability. 
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II. Working Paper #141. “Financial Imbalances in the Global Economy: 
Consequences for Brazil and Indonesia”  by R. Jump and T. McKinley 
 
Working Paper #141 (Jump and McKinley 2016) starts by constructing medium-term projections 
for global growth and financialisation. Similar to the Working Paper on India, it does so by utilizing 
the CAM global macro-econometric model. But it first concentrates on examining the trends over 
2016-2025 in four major blocs/countries that constitute, together, about 70% of global GDP. These 
are the USA, Europe, mainland China and the High-Income Region of East Asia (dominated by 
Japan and the Republic of Korea). Hence, developments in these four blocs/countries are likely to 
dominate global prospects over the medium term. 
I. Subdued Growth Along with Current-Account Imbalances 
Even when this Working Paper was first written, namely, in mid-2015, the prospects for global 
economic growth were subdued. This bleak outcome was projected at that time despite the fact 
that the model revealed more optimistic GDP growth rates for China (namely, about 7%) than has 
proven to be the case since mid-2015. The projected growth rates for the other three 
blocs/countries (USA, Europe and High-Income East Asia) were, at that time, in the lower range of 
2-3% over 2016-2025. 
Sharp global imbalances in current account surpluses and deficits were expected to worsen, to 
some degree, over the projected period. China and the High-Income East Asia bloc were projected 
to maintain, together, current-account surpluses of about 5% of GDP. Meanwhile, the USA’s 
current-account deficit was projected to progressively worsen towards -6% of GDP.  
While Europe as a whole would move towards current-account balance—especially since recession 
in the Southern Periphery of countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) has dampened the collective 
demand for imports—Germany would continue to maintain healthy current surpluses while the 
United Kingdom would replicate the U.S. trend of a progressively worsening current-account 
deficit (i.e., reaching around -6% of GDP). 
The original CAM projections also suggested that monetary outcomes for the four major 
blocs/countries over the period 2016-2025 would be at historically low levels. For example, the US 
real interest rate (on bonds) would continue a historical decline that began in the 1980s and 
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approach zero by 2025. A similar trend towards zero would characterize the interest-rate 
projections for High-Income East Asia.  
Also, the projections for the inflation rate for the four blocs suggest that it would remain well 
below 5% across the board. For example, the inflation rate for the USA would decline to below 2% 
by 2025 and that for Europe would actually end up being negative by 2020—indicating the severe 
danger of eventual deflation in this bloc. 
Hence, on the whole, the projections made in mid-2015 for the four major blocs/countries 
suggested that economic growth at the global level would remain subdued through 2025. 
Concomitantly, both inflation and real interest rates would remain historically low.  
Also, global imbalances in trade, income and capital flows would remain severe, especially 
between the USA, on the one hand, and China and High-Income East Asia (Japan and the Republic 
of Korea), on the other hand. In particular, the current-account deficit of the USA is projected to 
worsen significantly. But the US deficit (along with a notably worsening deficit in the United 
Kingdom) would be counter-balanced, to some degree, by continuing current-account surpluses in 
China and High-Income East Asia. 
In fact, the progressive decline in the US current-account deficit would replicate its decline 
between 1990 and 2006, i.e., just before the outbreak of the global financial crisis. But the earlier 
experience related to the severe 2008 financial shock warns us that such future trends are also very 
likely to be unsustainable.  
Within the context of the general focus of the Working Paper on the Emerging Economies of Brazil 
and Indonesia, its projected global trends suggest that if such economies retain fairly open 
external sectors, they will experience inevitable difficulties in shielding their households and 
enterprises from re-occurring external financial shocks. 
II. Capital Accounts and Net Asset Position 
Working Paper #141 provides a more concrete picture of these dangers by decomposing the flows 
on each country’s capital account into four components: i.e., net reserve acquisition, net foreign 
direct investment, net portfolio investment and the residual of net ‘other investment’. 
For example, China’s capital-account flows would remain modestly negative over the projected 
period, primarily because it would ‘export’ sizeable foreign-exchange reserves abroad while it 
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would receive less substantial net foreign direct investment and net ‘other investment’ into the 
country. 
In contrast, the USA’s capital-account flows would remain substantially positive over the projected 
period (e.g., approaching 5% of GDP by 2025) because it would enjoy substantial inward flows of 
short-term speculative portfolio investment and ‘other investment’ although it would still send, on 
a net basis, more foreign direct investment abroad than it would receive. 
In the US case, the net external asset position would be decidedly negative. By 2025 this asset 
position, as a percentage of GDP, would reach a -60%. This implies that, on this basis alone, the 
USA should remain extremely vulnerable to future capital outflows, especially of short-term 
speculative capital. However, the counter-balancing factor is that the USA would remain the 
dominant global reserve-currency and financial centre, and thus there would be major 
disincentives holding back such potential outflows. 
By contrast, China would remain in a fairly stable financial position at the global level. While it 
would enjoy net inward direct investment and ‘other investment’ (bank lending) by foreigners, 
some of which could conceivably flow back out of the economy (on an erratic basis), it would still 
retain an advantage by holding abroad a very large stock of foreign-exchange reserves. Hence, its 
net foreign asset position is projected to remain at about +40% of GDP by 2025. 
After examining trends at the global level (through the lens of the four major blocs/countries), 
Working Paper #141 turns it focus towards the two major Emerging Economies of Brazil and 
Indonesia. In some fundamental ways, these two countries share some common characteristics, 
such as the nature of their current-account balance and their net external asset position. Hence, 
their economic and financial vulnerabilities could continue to be similar over time. 
III. Economic and Financial Trends in Brazil 
Brazil suffered in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Its currency, the real, 
depreciated against the US dollar by about 60%, financial capital flooded out of its economy and it 
experienced a sharp economic recession. 
In mid-2015, when the Working Paper carried out its initial projections for Brazil, the CAM model 
suggested that its economic growth would be about -1% in 2015, it would escape from recession in 
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2017 and its growth rate would reach about 2.5% by 2025. However, ensuing trends, both in Brazil 
and at the global level, have been more negative since that time. 
The earlier projections also suggested that Brazil’s current-account deficit, which had been 
precipitated partly by the collapse in global commodity prices, would again be in surplus by 2019. 
This turn-around was expected to be driven by a recovery in its exports of primary commodities, 
including oil. 
However, though such a trend looked fairly positive at that time, Brazil’s net external asset 
position told a potentially different story. Post 2015, Brazil was projected to benefit from an 
increased inflow of foreign investment, including direct investment, portfolio investment and 
‘other investment’. Speculative capital in particular was expected to flood into Brazil, especially as 
growth was projected to be subdued, by contrast,  in Developed Economies, especially in Europe 
and Japan. 
These trends led to a Brazilian Net External Asset Position that was increasingly negative. This 
implied that foreigners had invested in many more Brazilian assets than Brazilian had invested in 
foreign assets. In fact, the only net positive holdings abroad for Brazil (specifically for the 
government) were foreign-exchange reserves. But such holdings were far outweighed by inward 
investment in Brazil by foreigners, especially short-term, unstable and highly speculative financial 
investment.  
These trends led to CAM projections that Brazil’s Net External Asset Position would turn 
increasingly negative. By 2021, for instance, this position was projected to plummet to about -52% 
of GDP and would remain at about -50% in 2025. This kind of financial position implied that Brazil 
would remain highly vulnerable to external economic and financial shocks. This is, in fact, what 
began to happen in mid-2015 and intensified during the rest of that year and into early 2016. 
Thus, even though the CAM projections suggested that Brazil would regain positive rates of 
economic growth and enjoy positive current-account balances during 2016-2025, its net global 
financial position would still progressively worsen—in the sense that it would be highly vulnerable 
to the periodic outbursts of a large, dramatic and debilitating outflow of speculative financial 
capital. 
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IV. Economic and Financial Trends in Indonesia 
Compared to Brazil, Indonesia had greater success in weathering the 2008 global financial crisis. 
The chief shock that it confronted was a downturn in its export demand. Despite this shock, the 
country continued to enjoy a 5% rate of economic growth through 2008 and 2009.  
This trend compares very favourably to the country’s dire experience during the Asia financial crisis 
in 1997-98. During that period, finance capital flew out of the country and the Indonesian rupia 
went into free fall, driving up the cost of imports as well as the country’s external debt burden. As a 
result, in 1998 the country’s economy shrank by an outlandish -13.7%. 
However, despite the fact that the Indonesian economy fared better during 2008-2009 than during 
the Asia financial crisis in the late 1990s, it has still shared, since that time, some of Brazil’s 
vulnerabilities to external demand shocks, financial turbulence and capital flight. The country’s 
foreign financial liabilities have remained highly liquid since they have been dominated by short-
term portfolio investment. 
Historically, both consumption expenditures and, to a lesser degree, investment demand have 
helped to sustain credible rates of economic growth in Indonesia. Government expenditures and 
the country’s trade balance have played a less significant role. Our original CAM projections for 
2016-2025 suggest that Indonesia’s rate of growth of GDP would average only a little less than 5% 
per year. This would certainly be an impressive performance. 
But the country’s trade balance would, in fact, be a drag on economic growth since it would be 
modestly negative throughout the projected period and would only recover to balance, i.e., 0% of 
GDP, by 2025. Part of the reason for such a lacklustre trend is that the country’s exports would 
continue to be dominated by primary commodities, especially oil, while its imports would continue 
to be dominated by manufactures. It is noteworthy that the CAM does not project any dramatic 
improvement in the global prices of primary commodities from their recent historical troughs. 
This combination of problematic trade position and highly liquid and speculative capital inflows 
heightens the financial risks that the country would continue to confront in the future. 
During an earlier period, up through 2005, the bulk of capital inflows into Indonesia were short-
term speculative forms of investment (often mainly bank lending). Such flows are customarily 
 
 
14 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
labelled as ‘other investment’ in order to differentiate them from portfolio investment and direct 
investment (FDI). 
In the build-up to and during the global financial crisis, such short-term speculative capital hurtled 
out of the Indonesian economy. But well after the financial crisis and especially by 2015, these 
forms of inward financial investment were again expanding within the country.  
However, such a resumption of financial inflows only served to intensify Indonesia’s vulnerabilities, 
especially since its offsetting stockpile of foreign exchange reserves were far too small to be used 
to counteract the danger of a sudden outflow of such speculative capital. 
As a result, during the projected period of 2016-2025, Indonesia’s Net External Asset Position is 
expected to progressively worsen, reaching the nadir of -64% of GDP by 2023-4. This level of 
financial dependency would exceed even that of Brazil, which even at its projected worst level (in 
2022) reached only -52% of GDP. 
In summary, Indonesia’s real economy is projected to perform fairly well over the period 2016-
2025. Private consumption and even investment would help propel economic growth. And the 
correction of the country’s current-account deficit would also contribute to stabilizing economic 
growth. However, the country would continue to remain highly reliant on the stability of the global 
prices of primary commodities, including that of oil. 
An additional factor that would play a major role in exposing the country to the prospect of 
recurrent financial instability would be the continuing substantial inflow of short-term financial 
capital, which would progressively serve to worsen its Net External Asset Position.  
In light of our original CAM projections of anaemic global economic growth through 2025 and 
continuing, if not worsening, global imbalances in current accounts—especially between the USA 
(and the UK), on the one hand, and China and other East Asian economies, on the other hand—
future healthy economic growth as well as financial stability in the major Emerging Economies of 
Brazil and Indonesia would certainly not be assured. 
Combined with their substantially negative Net External Asset Position, Indonesia and Brazil would 
likely confront and have to mitigate—from a relatively weak economic position—future recurrent 
bouts of financial instability and ensuing economic crises.  
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V. Updated CAM projections 
Working Paper #141 was revised in mid-2016 because of the worsening economic conditions at the 
global level, particularly in major emerging economies.  The CAM was aligned with the new 
forecasts for 2016 by the IMF in its April 2016 World Economic Outlook and the model then 
generated a new set of projections for the period 2017-2026 for both Brazil and Indonesia. This 
update focused on GDP, investment, the current account and the capital account. 
Brazil 
The Working Paper covered Brazil first. Because of the realignment with the projections produced 
by the IMF in mid-2016, the CAM projected that in both 2015 and 2016 GDP growth in Brazil would 
be -3.8%. However, after 2016 Brazil’s growth was projected to recover and stay around 2%-2.5% 
through 2026. However, such a recovery of growth was not expected to be driven by investment. 
After falling to about 12% of GDP by 2017, investment was expected recover to only about 13% by 
2026. 
The CAM’s new projections for Brazil’s current account are similar to those that it had generated 
earlier. Due in large part to depreciation of the exchange rate, Brazil’s current account as a ratio to 
GDP would begin recovering from a large deficit in 2016 (i.e., which would be about -5%) and turn 
modestly positive by 2022. By 2026 this surplus would increase to about 2% of GDP. 
The new projected trends in Brazil’s capital account position would be quite different from those 
through 2015. Inward foreign direct investment as a ratio to GDP is projected to essentially 
collapse, reaching 0% by 2018 and would continue close to zero thereafter.  
Portfolio investment would continue flowing into Brazil but would hover around only about 1% of 
GDP through 2026. In contrast, net ‘other investment’ would flow out of Brazil, reaching 2.4% of 
GDP by 2026. Brazil’s holdings of foreign exchange reserves would rise only marginally over the 
projected period, reaching just 0.4% of GDP by 2026.  
In sum, the net outflows of capital from Brazil would reach about 2.8% of GDP by 2026 while the 
net inflows would reach only about 1.4%.  
Thus, Brazil’s capital account is not projected to be in a favourable position: it would receive little 
FDI, its inward flows of capital would be dominated by volatile portfolio investment, and it would 
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hold a small stock of foreign exchange reserves with which it could counteract the effects of any 
precipitous outflow of financial capital. 
Indonesia 
The new CAM projections for Indonesia suggest somewhat different outcomes than those for 
Brazil although both countries would remain subject to some similar economic and financial 
forces. 
By 2017 Indonesia’s GDP growth is projected to reach 2%, then increase to about 4% by 2019 and 
stay roughly at this level through 2026. While Indonesia’s investment as a ratio to GDP boomed 
during the period 2003-2012, reaching the high level of 31%, the CAM projects that investment 
would decline throughout the projected period of 2017-2026. By 2026 investment would have 
fallen to 24% of GDP. Still, such a level would far exceed the 13% of GDP that Brazil’s investment is 
projected to reach in 2026. 
Indonesia’s current account would remain an area of concern. In 2013 the country already had a 
current-account deficit of -3.7% of GDP and this level recovered modestly to -2.4% of GDP by 
2015. But the CAM projects that the country’s current-account deficit would then progressively 
widen to -4.2% by 2026. 
In 2014 total financial inflows into Indonesia stood at 2.9% of GDP. But the CAM projects that by 
2019 total net financial inflows would decline significantly, reaching a low level of 1.6% of GDP. 
Thereafter, however, net financial inflows would recover, but reach only 2.3% of GDP by 2026. 
What is most significant about these trends, however, is that the net financial inflows into 
Indonesia would be dominated by increases in net ‘other investment’ and portfolio investment, the 
two most unstable forms of capital inflows. In addition, the country would command relatively 
small stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves with which it could protect its exchange rate from 
violent, financially induced oscillations. 
III. Working Paper #146. “International and Domestic 
Financialisation in Middle Income Countries: The Brazilian 
Experience” By A. Kaltenbrunner and J.P. Painceira 
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I. Introduction 
The distinctive value of Working Paper #146 (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2015) is that it closely 
and thoroughly examines concrete conditions in Brazil as an illustration of the general trend of 
financialisation that its authors believe is affecting in similar ways what they call ‘Emerging 
Capitalist Economies’. They undertake research on Brazil because they believe that the literature 
on financialisation has unduly focussed on ‘Core Capitalist Economies’ and has assumed that the 
conditions in this group of countries would be similar to those in Emerging Capitalist Economies 
(ECEs). 
The Working Paper’s basic argument is that financialisation in ECEs is shaped fundamentally by 
the integration of these countries into a financialised and structured international monetary and 
financial system and that this form of integration inevitably places ECEs in a subordinated and 
disadvantaged position.  
The Working Paper also points out that while international integration of these countries 
fundamentally shapes their domestic processes of financialisation, these resultant domestic 
processes, in turn, exacerbate their subordinated position within the structures of international 
financialisation.  
II. The International Monetary System and World Money 
Working Paper #146 argues that a fundamental characteristic of international financialisation is 
that it takes place within the hierarchical structure of the international monetary system. For 
example, the monetary conditions in the country with the highest liquidity premium (namely, the 
USA) will influence monetary conditions across the globe.  
In other words, international investors will invariably seek refuge during times of financial 
instability in the currency of such a dominant country. Hence, this Working Paper argues that 
‘world money’, which serves as the universal means of payment, becomes the inevitable outcome 
of the evolution of monetary conditions within global capitalist markets.  
Thus, ECEs as well as other developing economies are obliged to hoard ‘world money’ in order to 
effectively participate and compete in international markets for trade and finance. The US dollar is 
regarded by the authors of this Working Paper as ‘quasi’ world money. For example, when there is 
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an increasing international demand for protection against the loss of financial wealth, investors 
intensify their demand for the US dollar (or dollar-denominated financial assets, as well as gold). 
In examining concretely the nature of Brazil’s international financial integration and the 
repercussions on its form of domestic financialisation, this Working Paper focuses on two major 
channels of transmission. The first is the phenomenon of reserve accumulation and the associated 
financialisation of the country’s banks. The second is Brazil’s inevitable vulnerability to large and 
sudden movements of capital and oscillations in the value of its exchange rate. An important point 
is that these movements can be largely independent of trends in its domestic economic conditions. 
III. Exchange Rates and Interest Rates 
Since the currencies of ECEs such as Brazil have a lower liquidity preference, they have to offer 
higher interest rates in order to maintain investor demand for their financial assets. Moreover, 
because such countries occupy a subordinated position within the international monetary system, 
they face inevitable difficulties in issuing debt denominated in their own domestic currency. 
When ECEs have to offer international investors higher interest rates, such rates invariably depress 
the country’s capacities for promoting domestic investment and economic growth. Moreover, any 
depreciation of an ECE’s exchange rate will increase its external debt burden, and will often be 
associated with problems of short-term solvency and liquidity. When international investors play 
such a crucial role in influencing an ECE’s interest rates and its exchange rate, the currencies of 
ECEs will have difficulties in performing normal monetary functions. 
IV. The Working Definition of ‘Financialisation’ 
In view of the points discussed above, the authors of this Working Paper prioritise clarifying a 
working definition of ‘financialisation’. They define it as the structural changes in financial 
relations, practices and needs of the key economic agents of banks, households and non-financial 
corporations as a result of alternations in real capital accumulation.  
The process of financialisation manifests itself in variegated forms: 1) the increased incorporation 
of households into predatory credit relations (primarily through consumption credits and 
mortgages); 2) the increased reliance of banks on fees and income from trading (rather than from 
lending for productive activities); 3) the rise in bank funding from markets rather than deposit 
taking; and 4) the escalating involvement of large non-financial corporations in financial markets. 
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V. Trends of Capital Flows in Brazil 
Trends in the external liabilities of Brazil illustrate the country’s continuing vulnerabilities to 
international financial flows. For example, the country’s total stock of outstanding short-term (12-
month) external financial liabilities stood at US$ 679 billion (or about 46% of its GDP) in June 2008, 
just before the outbreak of the global financial crisis. In addition, the country’s financial liabilities 
stood at US$ 883 billion (or about 40% of its GDP) in March 2011, just before the worsening of the 
Eurozone crisis.  
Moreover, the traditional investors in ECEs such as Brazil, namely, banks and dedicated 
investment funds, have been joined by a large array of other financial actors—namely, institutional 
investors (such as pension and insurance funds) and new types of mutual funds (such as exchange-
traded funds and macro hedge funds). 
Given the enormous size of this current wide array of ‘investors’, a relatively small reallocation of 
their portfolio shares can have a huge effect on the capital flows and the economy of an ECE such 
as Brazil. Moreover, this wide array of investors has very diverse investment strategies, thereby 
increasing the complexity of foreign investment in the Brazilian economy.  
Since these investors have become exposed to an increasingly complex array of domestic currency 
assets, they have contributed to altering the basic characteristics of Brazil’s economic and financial 
structure. As an indication of the scale of their activities, the value of the participation of such 
foreign investors in the Brazilian stock market rose from about 25% of the total in 2003 to more 
than 50% in 2014. 
VI. Amassing Foreign Exchange Reserves 
In order to protect itself from financial instability, Brazil (like many other ECEs) has had to amass 
an increasingly large stockpile of foreign exchange reserves. For instance, in 2004, the country held 
about US$ 50 billion of such assets, but by 2014 it was holding US$ 364 billion.  
Working Paper #146 argues that such large reserve accumulation is an inevitable outcome of the 
international financialisation of ECEs as well as their subordinated insertion into such a system. 
Independently of their current account position, ECEs have become large recipients of capital 
inflows. For example, total capital inflows into ECEs ballooned from US$ 299 billion in 2000 to US$ 
1.1 trillion in 2014. 
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In response, the central banks of ECEs have been obliged to build up a large ‘war-chest’ of foreign 
exchange reserves in order to help protect their economies from sudden stops in such inflows or 
rapid outflows of such financial capital. 
VII. Switching from Investment to Consumption 
In addition, central banks have had to respond to such large financial inflows by attempting to 
‘sterilize’ their impact on the domestic economy. They have used ‘repurchase agreements’ with 
domestic banks, which have involved transferring domestic public debt securities to banks in order 
to mop up excessive inflows of financial capital. The purpose has been to drain the excess of bank 
reserves out of the economy.  
But, as the concrete trends in Brazil illustrate, the principal result of such central bank 
interventions has been, unfortunately, that domestic banks have used such new public assets as a 
basis to issue more short-term liabilities. These loans have been used mainly for expanding 
domestic household consumption and housing mortgages. In the process, the economic dynamics 
of the household sector have become essentially more ‘financialised’.  
At the same time, domestic banks have ended up holding a larger share of short-term assets and 
decreasing their long-term lending for the domestic productive sector. So there has been a 
dramatic switch in credit allocation from what could be considered productive lending to industry 
towards more short-term lending for household consumption and the financing of housing. When 
household consumption has stagnated, for example, banks have switched their lending to real 
estate. 
The overall effect of the actions of the central bank in attempting to sterilize the impact of 
increased inflows of financial capital has only encouraged domestic banks to engage in more short-
term lending.  
VIII. The International Transfer of Resources 
In general, such capital inflows, the increased holding of foreign exchange reserves by the central 
bank in response and the role of domestic banks in moving towards more short-term domestic 
lending have contributed to slower growth in ECEs and reinforced their subordinate position within 
the global financial system.  
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Brazilian domestic Non-Financial Corporations have also become increasingly enmeshed in 
speculative ventures. For example, many of them have significantly increased their foreign 
currency borrowing on offshore markets. But frequently such borrowing, such as in US dollars, can 
be used to invest back into Brazilian domestic currency assets and thus take advantage of 
favourable exchange rate movements. 
As a general trend, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the governments of 
countries such as Brazil implies a constant transfer of resources from ECEs and other developing 
economies to Core Capitalist Economies (CCEs). The foreign exchange reserves that a central bank 
such as Brazil’s holds abroad have a very low rate of return.  
At the same time, the inflows of foreign capital into Brazil command a much higher rate of return. 
Combining this persistent inequality in rates of return with the phenomenon that productive loans 
to domestic industry are being increasingly supplanted by unproductive household loans helps to 
clarify that the dynamic of unequal exchange between ECEs and CCEs (such as between Brazil and 
the USA) is being intensified by the general process of financialisation. 
IX. Exacerbating Financial Vulnerabilities and Uneven Development 
In addition, in such a global system an ECE such as Brazil remains highly vulnerable to large and 
sudden outflows of speculative capital and the ensuing depreciation of its exchange rate, both of 
which could be, in fact, largely extraneous to any significant changes in its domestic economic 
fundamentals. Even when such financial investment remains within Brazil and is denominated in 
its domestic currency, the Real, it is often concentrated in very short-term, high-yielding and 
volatile asset classes. 
In summary, Working Paper #146 has sought to demonstrate that through various channels, the 
increased ‘financialisation’ of an ECE such as Brazil is fundamentally shaped by its subordinated 
position within the international financial and economic system. Moreover, such a financialisation 
process serves only to cement this subordination and exacerbate uneven economic development. 
And it is important to emphasize that this process works both through the functioning of the real 
economy and the self-reinforcing dynamics within financial markets themselves. 
IV. Working Paper #142. “Financialisation and Development: The 
South African Case Study” By G. Isaacs 
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I. Introduction 
Working Paper #142 (Isaacs 2015) focused on the impact of financialisation in (post-apartheid) 
South Africa. It draws its results from analysing South African macroeconomic time-series and 
firm-level datasets. The macroeconomic data allow for an investigation of broad trends within the 
economy and the advance of financialisation and its impact. The firm-level data help to interrogate 
the impact of financialisation on non-financial corporations in particular. This investigation is 
complemented by other national data – such as on housing markets – as well as international 
datasets.  
The topic of this Working Paper poses a number of challenges since causal relationships, in this 
case between financialisation and development, are difficult to prove. The case study also spans a 
vast amount of material exploring the nature of financial liberalisation and development and 
assessing the resultant impact on growth, patterns of investment and poverty and inequality. The 
approach adopted is to compare the international evidence regarding the consequences of 
financialisation with the specific trends observed in the South African context. Though an 
imperfect exercise, this approach can hopefully be potentially illuminating. 
II. Financialisation and Trends in the South African Economy 
South Africa underwent a process of liberalisation and financialisation beginning at the dawn of its 
democracy (1994) but the roots of this process can be located in preceding policies and 
transformations.  
Key policy transformations accelerated between 1994 and 1996, a period during which: the 
government returned to international capital markets; the financial Rand was abandoned; 
restrictions on foreign bank entry and foreign participation on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) were lifted; limits on institutional investors’ financial trading, locally and abroad, were eased; 
and FDI requirements were relaxed.  
This period was followed later by inflation targeting and further market liberalisation. 
Subsequently, South Africa has been plagued by: lackluster growth; high levels of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment; and low levels of real investment—all in the context of a marked 
financialisation of the economy. 
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This financialisation is broadly visible in the expansion of the financial sector, which has grown at a 
rate of 4.7% per year compared with the GDP growth rate of 3.1%. Thus, this sector expanded as a 
share of GVA from approximately 13% at the end of apartheid (which lasted 1950-1993) to 
approximately 19% over the next twenty years (1994-2013).  
Financial markets have experienced significant expansion, with their market capitalisation to GDP 
ratio rising from 123% in 1990 to 291% in 2007, alongside strong growth in currency and derivative 
exchanges. Institutional investors have come to play an important role in the economy while the 
traditional distinctions between banks, merchant banks, instalment credit houses and building 
societies have been dissolved.  
Non-financial firms have also become subject to the imperatives of financialisation, based on the 
emergence of a new ‘market for corporate control’, the prioritisation of a ‘shareholder value’ 
orientation and the increasing participation of these firms in financial market activity.  
This trend has occurred in tandem with their internationalisation and insertion into already 
financialised global markets and global value chains. These trends have resulted, in turn, in the 
importation and imposition of financialised business norms on South African businesses as a 
whole.  
One key consequence of the altered investment patterns (as has been the case elsewhere in the 
world) has been the steady rise in the acquisition of financial assets along with the concomitant 
decline in gross capital formation. The examination of such investment patterns forms a central 
part of this Working Paper’s analysis. 
Financialisation has also deeply affected households through an expansion of financial services. 
The last decade has witnessed a resurgence of mortgage financing (though still skewed against the 
poor) and an expansion of consumer credit together with a marked rise in both the assets and 
liabilities of households. Housing now accounts for the overall negative net financial position of 
households.  
Together these trends led to a very large real-estate bubble and a consumption boom that are 
widely recognised to have driven the economic growth of the mid-2000s. These trends have all 
been fuelled in large part by short-term foreign capital inflows (in contrast to the country’s long-
term trend of capital outflows).   
 
 
24 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
Domestic financial development, measured often by the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, has 
accelerated rapidly in South Africa. The international evidence has suggested that there is a 
turning point at which further financial development is growth-retarding, and this is usually when 
the credit to GDP ratio reaches between 75% and 100%.  
The Working Paper shows that South Africa has already reached this threshold. It also presents 
ample evidence that financial liberalization—contrary to assertions by its proponents—has not 
been growth-enhancing. 
III. Financial Liberalisation and Capital Flows 
South Africa has undergone significant financial liberalisation, with its economy in recent years 
becoming more financiallyh open than other comparable Emerging Economies. But a large body 
of evidence shows clearly that financial integration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for rapid economic growth, nor is there a predominant statistically significant relationship between 
changes in financial openness and economic growth when other major growth determinants are 
included. This lack of a significant relationship is particularly the case in developing countries.  
Negative impacts of financial liberalisation on economic growth and other macroeconomic trends 
have often been observed and are attributed to the propensity of financial liberalisation to lead to: 
instability, volatility and crises; sudden reversals of capital flows; inequality; and a dysfunctional 
allocation of capital both internationally and nationally. South Africa has suffered from many of 
these negative impacts.  
Volatility  
The Working Paper documents that as the gross stock of foreign assets and liabilities in South 
Africa has increased, so too has the volatility of capital flows. Volatility is well recognized to have 
negative economic impacts. The evidence presented in the Working Paper demonstrates that 
movements in capital flows have been closely associated with the erratic and volatile nature of the 
South Africa exchange rate, and that this channel has been the main means through which crises 
have occurred in South Africa. 
Capital Outflows 
South Africa has also suffered since liberalization from significant capital outflows, depleting 
thereby the funds available for domestic investment. This effect has occurred in a range of ways. 
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First, capital flight is estimated to have averaged 12% of GDP between 2001 and 2007, peaking at 
23% in 2007. Associated with this trend has been the staggering statistic that 37% of all reported 
South African assets are held abroad (as of December 2014) and are sitting in low-tax jurisdictions. 
This level represents an increase, in fact, over the 24% reported in December 2001.  
Second, South Africa, like much of the developing world, has been acquiring large holdings of 
foreign exchange reserves, particularly from 2000 onwards. The sterilisation process associated 
with these reserves and the foregone interest on the alternative investment of these funds 
heighten vulnerabilities in the domestic economy and deplete domestic resources.  
Third, as a result of these trends, increasing dividend and interest payments have been made to 
shareholders and creditors abroad. 
Patterns of Inward Investment  
The nature of foreign investment within South Africa also poses risks to the economy. A growing 
share of foreign assets and liabilities has been short-term in nature, with a sharp growth in 
portfolio investment flows. Such flows are subject to rapid reversals, with the potential to pose 
significant harm to the domestic economy.  
These portfolio investment inflows are necessary to finance South Africa’s current account (in part 
due to the capital outflows discussed above) but have to be sustained by high interest rates 
(relative to those in developed economies). This result can thus dampen domestic investment. The 
rise in the foreign indebtedness of the South African private sector is also a major cause for 
concern.  
IV. The Domestic Allocation of Credit 
Related to the forms that financial flows have assumed is the use to which credit in the domestic 
economy has been put (whether for productive, consumption or speculative purposes), which 
markets it has entered (for example, stock or real estate markets), and to whom it has been lent 
(i.e., to businesses, banks, households or the state).   
A significant body of literature is emerging that illustrates that non-productive credit, of which 
household credit is a large component, is ultimately growth-retarding. Consumption credit, 
through financing consumption demand, creates high levels of gross indebtedness and does not 
generate the conditions for its own repayment.  
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Ultimately, households become indebted beyond their means, and this result heightens the 
probability of financial instability and crisis, including business failures when credit levels become 
unsustainable (as seen in the sub-prime crisis of 2007-8). 
Since such credit funds are channelled through the financial sector, they heighten the prospect of 
speculation and the allocation of resources to the financial, and not the productive, sector. This 
trend has a net negative effect on sustainable, productive and long-term economic growth and 
development in South Africa.  
It must also be noted that over-investment via productive credit can lead to over-capacity and 
excess supply while the hoarding of funds by enterprises can result in under-investment in the 
economy at large and ensuing stagnation. The extent and nature of international capital flows 
have a profound influence on domestic credit allocation, with short-term non-FDI flows (which 
have been dominant in South Africa) promoting adverse patterns. 
There have also been significant changes in the evolution of borrowing and lending in South Africa. 
Households, which were the largest net savers in the 1970s, became net debtors by the 2000s, and 
this trend played an important role in driving the overall levels of indebtedness in the economy. 
The level of debt to GDP increased from below 60% in 1994 to over 85% in 2008. This trend fuelled 
consumption-led growth in the mid-2000s.  
The majority of this debt was for mortgages, but other forms of consumption credit have also 
risen, particularly for low-income households. For example, short-term consumption debt, via 
credit card debt, store cards and unsecured lending, has risen steeply, as has the number of 
impaired loans, indicating the unsustainability of such lending. 
The Working Paper also documents that debt expansion in South Africa from 2002 onwards has 
been supported predominantly by the foreign sector and that this tendency has been particularly 
true of the consumption-led boom of 2002/3 to 2006/7. This trend of debt expansion has been 
indicative of how the foreign sector has fuelled credit expansion and how that effect has decreased 
savings in the domestic economy. Moreover, the ensuing effects have also tremendously buoyed 
real-estate prices and stock-market capitalisation and trading.  
Finally, between 2009 and 2011 the private corporate sector in South Africa became a net supplier 
of credit, with net credit/debt supply/acquisition close to zero in subsequent years. This has 
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provided evidence of the over-capitalisation of non-financial corporations (NFCs) and their 
reserves of cash savings. Despite this impact, corporations have still taken on large amounts of 
debt, often channelled towards unproductive purposes, a topic to which this summary will now 
turn.  
V. Domestic Patterns of Investment 
Crucial to the process of financialisation in South Africa are the patterns of domestic investment. 
In the name of ‘shareholder value maximisation’ and as a result of South African corporates 
becoming more deeply intertwined with financial markets, funds have been drawn away from real 
fixed investment in the productive sectors of the economy.  
The precipitous rise in institutional investors – which have more than doubled their assets as a 
share of GDP since 1990 – has contributed towards a ‘market for corporate control’ and has thus 
exacerbated short-termism and prioritising narrow financial-market metrics of success. Such 
trends have been shown elsewhere in the world to have undermined real fixed investment and 
growth, and have been associated with casualisation of labour, downsizing and outsourcing.  
The above phenomena can be observed in the growth of the ‘rentier share’ for non-financial 
corporations in South Africa. The related pressures are clear in the growth in the pay-outs of 
dividends and interest and in the use of share buybacks by the non-financial corporate sector.  
As a result, there has been a rise in both investment income and dividend pay-outs as a share of 
operating profits for non-financial corporations, together with a decline in gross fixed capital 
formation (as a percentage of GDP) as well as a decline in the growth rate of fixed capital stock.  
On the macroeconomic level, the financialised business environment in South Africa has been 
characterised by the volatility of financial markets and hence a high degree of uncertainty, making 
large physical investments less attractive.  
Capital-market liberalisation – which has increased uncertainty, raised real interest rates and 
exacerbated exchange-rate and capital-flow volatility – has combined with a lack of availability of 
long-term credit to intensify competition in goods markets. Also, the presence of high returns in 
financial markets has precipitated altered investment decisions by non-financial corporations. 
These effects have resulted in an aggregate reduction in productive investment.  
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These results help pull together the various elements discussed in the Working Paper. They 
demonstrate that the imperatives of financialisation tend to reduce aggregate fixed investment 
and that this adverse effect must be compensated for in order to maintain aggregate demand and 
profitability. 
Credit-fuelled spending is thus a crucial response, supported by asset bubbles against which funds 
can be borrowed. In the short run, profitability can also be maintained by financial market 
speculation, which has become increasingly linked with the expansion of credit in the form of a 
dizzying array of financial assets that are further and further removed from aiding the productive 
capacity of the economy.  
These trends are apparent in South Africa. But they exhibit unique features, one of which is the 
exclusion of the poorest from financial markets. This perverse system has not come crashing 
down, in part because South African banks have not engaged in a similar scope of speculative 
investment as banks in the US have. But a slow-burn crisis is still underway, with a real-investment 
strike by businesses at its heart. The final topic of this Working Paper is the impact of 
financialisation on distribution. 
VI. Poverty and Inequality 
At the global level, there is a close correlation between rising financialisation and increasing 
inequality, with resultant negative effects on poverty. This trend is due to general instability and 
poor economic growth, the diversion of funds away from employment-generating productive 
investment, the concomitant adverse transformation of work, the decline in labour’s bargaining 
power and the prioritisation of shareholder value maximisation.  
The Working Paper documents that in South Africa this phenomenon has been observable in the 
falling wage share and increasing income inequality. There has also been a very uneven 
distribution of financial wealth, all of which has been compounded by rising unemployment and a 
fall in the share of employment in the manufacturing sector.  
In conclusion, the Working Paper illustrates the robust nature of financialisation in South Africa 
and how it has accelerated financial development and liberalisation, driving patterns of capital 
flows and domestic credit allocation and altering trends in domestic investment and distribution. 
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Together, these effects have constituted a toxic mix, which has had significantly deleterious 
effects on South African economic growth and development. 
 
V. Working Paper #143. “Financialisation, Uneven Development 
and Faltering Governance: The Case of Turkey” By Z. Aydun, 
M. Byurburg, O. Bedirhanoglu et al. 
 
I. Introduction 
Working Paper #143 (Aydun et al. 2016) shows that Turkey is a country where the need for 
economic adjustment has emerged periodically since the end of the Second World War. Indeed, 
there have been stabilisation programmes for more than two decades in response to balance of 
payment difficulties that the country has encountered while pursuing a strategy of industrial 
development, whether planned or otherwise.  
But with the launching of the January 1980 stabilisation programme, there was an 
acknowledgement in the international financial community as well as in domestic political and 
business circles that a qualitatively different programme should be proposed. Indeed, the country 
initiated an ambitious programme of structural adjustment even before such a strategy was 
formally spelled out by the Bretton Woods institutions.  
This programme signified a radical change since the establishment of the Turkish Republic both in 
the mode of articulation of the Turkish economy with the world economy and in the role that the 
state played in conducting economic policy. One of the striking changes of the 1980s was that 
Turkey’s integration with the world economy gained a new salience as an end in itself, at least at 
the level of economic and political discourse. 
Along with this change there was an official denunciation of Import Substitution Industrialisation 
(ISI) as the source of the country’s balance-of-payment difficulties and macroeconomic 
instabilities. Thus, this change paved the way for the adoption of an export-oriented trade and 
development strategy based on a more market-directed system of resource allocation. Most 
importantly, this change would set the stage for a prolonged process of financial liberalisation that 
would entail a series of major ramifications for the Turkish financial and economic system.  
No less importantly, Turkey’s ensuing process of integration with the world economy would 
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entrench international finance capital as the prevailing determinant of the developmental 
trajectory of its economy. In addition, the Bretton Woods institutions would become major 
determinants of the country’s policy-making process. Thus Turkey’s experience has led to a 
process whereby the key ‘policymakers’ (the decisive sources of policy ideas, design and 
implementation) are outside the country. 
As an important part of this process, Turkey adopted capital-account liberalization in 1989. The 
ensuing sudden stops and reversals of capital inflows led thereafter to two deep crises, the first in 
1994 and the second in 2001.  
These crises were followed later by a deep recession in 2009. In effect, Turkey has become trapped 
in foreign-debt dominated current-account deficits and a volatile growth environment subject to 
the vagaries of international finance capital. Though the reversal of short-term speculative capital 
inflows is often associated with deterioration of the macroeconomic fundamentals of a country, it 
is often not recognized that such a reversal frequently results from the effects of the capital inflows 
themselves on domestic macroeconomic conditions. 
In the early years of the 21st century the most striking aspects of Turkey’s political economy have 
been the persistence of open unemployment and price inflation under conditions of a crisis-prone 
economic structure; long-standing and rapidly expanding external deficits; and the marginalization 
of the labor force along with the dramatic deterioration of the economic conditions of the working 
poor.  
II. The Role of EU Candidacy in Redefining Turkey’s Development 
Paradigm 
The modes of integration of the Turkish economy with the global economy in the 2000s were 
shaped by a variety of interrelated international and domestic dynamics.  In fact, the last month of 
the year 1999 could be considered as an important landmark in this process since it witnessed not 
only the granting of candidate status to Turkey by the EU’s Helsinki European Council but also the 
approval of a three-year stand-by agreement with the IMF.  
Yet within less than a year, while the coalition government in power had been diligently 
implementing the IMF stand-by agreement, the Turkish economy had undergone a typical case of 
“twin crises”, in which a balance of payments crisis took place simultaneously with a crisis of its 
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banking sector. However, the response to these twin crises was the adoption of the country’s 
“Programme towards a Strong Economy”, which was based on two new stand-by agreements with 
the IMF in 2001 and 2002 that would re-affirm the government’s determination to doggedly persist 
with its structural reforms.  
This policy direction led to a historical process that was shaped by a double external anchor, 
namely simultaneous IMF and EU discipline. Namely, the process of Turkey’s ‘Europeanisation’ 
assumed the role of the ‘whip of external necessity’, as the EU Commission’s Accession Partnership 
for Turkey coincided with the implementation of the structural reform programmes imposed by the 
IMF and the World Bank. 
No less significantly, the IMF had no inhibition in putting into effect yet another three-year stand-
by agreement in early 2005 even when there was neither a balance-of-payment nor a banking 
crisis on the horizon. The justification given for this agreement was that Turkey remained 
vulnerable to ‘swings in international investor sentiment towards emerging markets’ despite 
having implemented a series of ‘structural reforms’ under IMF and World Bank guidance.  
Critics have claimed that there has been an ‘identification of the public interest with the interests 
of the financial sector’ by the advocates of this policy agenda, which has been designed to 
facilitate the role of financialisation in ‘minimising the impact of crises upon the economy’ as well 
as achieving ‘the socialisation of the losses of the financial sector’. 
In the context of its EU pre-accession, Turkey continued to benefit from EU financial assistance. 
The Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)—which was created as a single instrument to consolidate 
the mechanisms of EU financial assistance to candidate and potential candidate countries—started 
being implemented in Turkey’s 2007-2013 budget period. The IPA allocated 4.8 billion euros to 
support the country at that time.  
However, the relatively positive relations between Turkey and the EU had already started to 
become tense in 2004-2005, especially at the political level. The accession of Turkey to the EU 
turned into a lengthy “open-ended” process, which was perceived by Turkey as a form of 
discrimination, especially compared to the experience of other accession countries covered by the 
same Copenhagen Criteria.  
In the wake of the protracted crisis of 2008-2009, which soon took the form of a crisis of the entire 
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Eurozone, the European Commission proposed to implement the “Positive Agenda” in its 2011-
2012 Enlargement Strategy Document in order supposedly to bring “fresh dynamics and a new 
momentum” to the Turkey-EU relations.  
In addition to this Positive Agenda initiative, an important factor in recent years in determining the 
Turkey-EU relationship has been Turkey’s call to upgrade, deepen and modernize the Customs 
Union. In May 2015, for example, the European Commission and Turkey announced the initiation 
of procedures to modernize and extend the Customs Union in a way that could enhance and 
“boost” EU-Turkey bilateral trade and commercial relations—supposedly not as an alternative 
route but as a complementary initiative to the accession negotiations of Turkey.  
III. The Implications of Financialisation for Redefining Turkey’s 
Development Policies 
In the wake of Turkey’s 2001 crisis, the country’s macroeconomic trajectory was shaped in line with 
the post-Washington Consensus. In a nutshell, the earlier motto of “get the prices right” was 
replaced by the new motto “get the institutions right”. This new policy direction led to a broad 
consensus on a ‘great moderation’ approach implemented through inflation-targeting central 
banking, fiscal discipline, fully flexible and freely floating exchange rates and open capital 
accounts, along with a renewed emphasis on privatization and reduced regulation of the labor 
market.  
A closer look at the impact of financialisation on the Turkish economy reveals the characteristic 
features of a ‘debt-led growth regime’. Since the 2001 crisis, Turkey’s current account balance has 
always been in deficit, and the size of its deficits has grown in absolute terms. There have been two 
major reasons for this pattern: (1) Turkey’s major trade partner, the European Union, has also 
experienced recession; and (2) the Turkish economy’s dependence on foreign capital has 
intensified.  
While the foreign inflow of capital into Turkey averaged only about US$ 4 billion per year in the 
1990s, it jumped to US$ 30 billion during the period 2002-2007. In the process, Turkey’s economy 
became increasingly reliant on a persistent inflow of finance capital. 
A disproportionate proportion of the influx of finance capital has been associated with a widening 
current-account deficit so that there has been a correspondingly necessary rise in the country’s 
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accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves. But, at the same time, the persistently large financial 
inflows have driven up the price of domestic stocks and real estate.  
Concomitantly, Turkey has suffered from a low rate of domestic savings, which has only served to 
heighten its reliance on foreign capital. This low rate of domestic savings has corresponded with 
robust consumption spending, often associated with a rising demand for imported durable goods, 
thereby worsening the current account. 
The Turkish economy since the 2000s has thus represented a typical case of a foreign-capital 
dependent country, with an appreciated currency, steadily deteriorating current account deficits, 
relatively cheap foreign credits along with relatively high real interest rates, a relatively low 
inflation rate, and a resultant process of de-industrialization (because industrial capital cannot 
compete with cheap imported goods). 
As a result, the country’s rate of economic growth, especially in the 2000s, has depended on 
domestic consumption-driven spending. And its persistent current account deficit has 
corresponded with the accumulation of large financial liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
The increase in global liquidity, first through massive increases in trade imbalances and second 
through expansionary monetary policies in the advanced economies, has contributed to Turkey’s 
financial imbalances. During this process Turkey has imported large quantities of energy, 
intermediate inputs and capital goods while it has exported, to a large extent, low value added 
products.  
The competitiveness of its exports has been supported mostly by relatively low labor costs. 
Second, foreign capital inflows, due to the increase of global liquidity over the 2000s, have led to 
the appreciation of Turkey’s currency, which has created an additional burden on its export 
competitiveness while serving to increase its imports. 
IV. Turkey’s Foreign and Domestic Debt 
The predictable outcome of ever-growing current account deficits can be traced through the 
evolution of Turkey’s external debt. It is noteworthy that unlike in previous decades, private-sector 
debt, both financial and nonfinancial, started to eclipse public-sector debt by the mid-2000s. But 
there were no serious attempts by Turkey’s policymakers to address this problem. 
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This reluctance was due to the belief that capital inflows helped spur economic growth and that 
they were influential in reducing inflationary pressures through the ensuing appreciation of the 
Turkish lira. The Turkish economy has not been a unique example of this pattern since the frantic 
global search for yield has led to high levels of capital inflows into Emerging Economies.  
In contrast to the traditional stabilization policies that aimed to achieve devaluation as a basis to 
restrain domestic demand, the new macroeconomic orthodoxy sought to maintain high interest 
rates in order to continue attracting speculative foreign capital from international financial 
markets. As a result, Turkey has become trapped in a foreign-debt dominated current-account 
deficit and a speculative, volatile growth environment subjected to the vagaries of international 
finance capital. 
Economic growth has suffered accordingly. In fact, the average annual rate of growth of Turkey’s 
economy during its previous historical period of import-substituting industrialization, namely, 
1962-1979, was 6.5%. But its average rate of economic growth during 1980-2011 was only 4.3%. 
Prior to the 2001 crisis, Turkey’s government was running sizeable fiscal deficits (while the private 
sector was running large financial surpluses). These public deficits were often -5% to -10% of GDP. 
But in the 2000s the government began to aggressively cut public spending, privatize its 
enterprises and introduce new taxes. As a result, it began to run primary surpluses. Along with 
credible rates of economic growth, the fiscal restraint of the Turkish government was lauded 
internationally. 
Even though Turkey’s total external debt continued to increase in the 2000s and the 2010s, the 
government’s external debt as a percentage of GDP declined. This development has not been a 
unique phenomenon. In fact, many developing countries in Latin America experienced similar 
trends over the same period.  
Factors such as the positive difference between the growth rate and the real interest rate, large 
budgetary primary surpluses, and the appreciation of domestic currencies against the US dollar 
have all contributed to these effects. However, these same factors have also carried a destructive 
potential since they often then lead to sudden periodic capital outflows and sharp depreciation of a 
country’s currency. 
While government debt as a percentage of GDP has been in decline since 2001, private-sector debt 
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has been on the rise. As the government’s financial balance has improved, its indebtedness has 
declined. But the debt stock of non-financial corporations and households has increased. Based on 
these developments, the pattern of economic development in the 2000s and the 2010s has been 
dependent on the domestic private sectors’ ability to borrow, especially from abroad. 
As interest rates declined in the financial centres of developed economies, such as in the USA and 
Europe, Turkey’s banks relied more on a strategy of borrowing in foreign currency and lending in 
domestic markets. This process has been accelerated by quantitative easing in developed 
economies.  
Moreover, non-financial corporations in Turkey also began to borrow abroad, by issuing foreign-
currency denominated bonds, but mostly they relied on borrowing through bank loans. Such a 
process has also served to intensify the financial fragility of the Turkish economy since the ability 
of the government to contain such private debt is limited.  
A summary of Turkey’s financial accounts provides further confirmation of the differences in 
financial assets, liabilities and net worth across the major categories of the economy, namely, the 
general government, the non-financial corporate sector, the financial sector and the household 
sector. 
During the period 2009-2013, for example, non-financial corporations in Turkey had the lowest 
financial net worth, e.g., between -90% and -120% of GDP. In contrast, the net worth of financial 
corporations hovered around 0%. The financial net worth of the general government slowly 
improved, rising from about -21% of GDP to -15.6%.  
The financial net worth of households remained the most positive of any domestic categories 
though it declined slightly—namely, from about 29% of GDP to about 23.5%. The most worrying 
trend has been the steady increase in household borrowing. It increased from 3% of GDP in 2003 to 
21% in 2012.  
In fact, the positive net worth of the household sector is likely due to the increased holdings of the 
wealthiest 10% of households. Their share of wealth increased, for example, from 67% of the total 
in 2000 to 78% in 2014. Thus, according to available comparative data on wealth holdings, Turkey 
has very high wealth inequality. 
Not surprisingly, the net worth of the Rest of the World vis-à-vis Turkey remained decidedly 
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positive during 2009-2013, rising, in fact, from about 44% of Turkey’s GDP to over 55%. 
V. The Dynamics of Central Banking in Turkey 
The effectiveness of the monetary policies of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) 
has become increasingly limited since 2001 as the economy has become more ‘financialised’. For 
example, financial flows into and out of Turkey have been determined primarily by the global 
appetite for risk instead of domestic economic conditions.  Thus, financial flows have tended to be 
beyond the control of domestic monetary policies.  
Between 2001 and 2006 the CBRT adopted inflation targeting policies and was largely able to 
meet its targets. Thus, it was successful in increasing its credibility. But as international financial 
flows became larger and more erratic, the CBRT, like other central banks in major emerging 
economies, became less effective in its efforts to manage monetary conditions.  
Such large financial flows had largely stemmed from the unconventional monetary policies of 
advanced countries, which had begun to pump greater liquidity into their financial markets. This 
trend triggered increased capital flows to developing countries in a frantic search for higher yields. 
Such a significant influx of financing tended to appreciate the exchange rates of developing 
countries. Initially, appreciation of the Lira helped the central bank of Turkey to get close to its 
inflation targets.  
But this appreciation tended to exacerbate Turkey’s current account, which was already facing 
sizeable deficits. Even though its current account did improve as a result of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, its deficit widened again after 2010. In fact, the performance of the Turkish 
economy on this front has been one of the worst among comparable countries. 
Turkey’s rising current account deficits have had to be financed by a massive influx of financial 
capital. In fact, between 2010 and 2014, the country had to attract capital inflows that were 
equivalent to about 8% of its GDP. The CBRT benefitted to a minor degree because it could divert 
such inflows into amassing foreign exchange reserves.  
However, because the country was still shouldering a huge burden of foreign debt (largely incurred 
by the private sector), the ratio of Turkey’s reserves to its external debt remained relatively low. 
Moreover, the ratio of the country’s short-term financial inflows to its long-term financial inflows 
increased after 2010, thereby heightening its financial instability. For example, the share of net 
 
 
37 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
foreign direct investment in total financial inflows declined from about 30% during the period 
2002-2008 to only 15% during 2010-2014.  
Moreover, the Turkish Lira has become extremely volatile in response to the vagaries of short-term 
financial inflows and outflows. In fact, between 2002 and 2014, Turkey is reported to have had one 
of the most volatile currencies among comparable emerging economies. 
Such externally driven volatility has hampered the efforts of Turkey’s central bank to stabilize the 
economy. For example, while the CBRT has sought to contain credit growth, such as seeking to 
maintain it within a 15% growth target, it has largely been ineffective in doing so. The principal 
reason is that bank credit to the private sector in Turkey has mainly followed the patterns of net 
capital flows, which have largely followed a boom and bust cycle. 
In the era of financialisation, capital flows into major emerging economies such as Turkey are 
largely determined by global risk appetite rather than domestic economic trends. And such risk 
appetite is often correlated with factors such as the interest rate policies of developed-country 
central banks, such as the Federal Reserve. Thus, central banks in Turkey and other major 
emerging economies and developing countries more broadly are largely obliged to align their 
policy interest rates with those of the Federal Reserve or the ECB. As a result, they have very 
limited practical independence in their monetary policies. 
VI. The Impact on Financialisation on Sectoral Growth and Labour 
Conditions 
The economic and financial trends outlined above have had a crucial impact on Turkey’s 
manufacturing sector. This sector had been developing medium-tech manufacturing from the 
mid-1990s until the global financial crisis, and machinery and motor-vehicles sectors played the 
leading role in that transformation. Over this same period, the textile and clothing sectors rapidly 
lost their shares in Turkey’s total output and employment.  
However, the 2008 financial crisis contributed to reversing these sectoral trends. The machinery 
and motor-vehicles industries experienced a decline in their shares of total output and 
employment after 2009 whereas the textile and clothing sectors out-performed all other sectors.  
These changes show that the march of Turkish manufacturing towards expanding medium-
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technology sectors and their accompanying integration into global production chains have been 
very sensitive to what happens in the country’s export markets (and in the case of motor vehicles, 
specifically to what happens in the European markets). Moreover, these sectors do not have export 
positions that are stable enough to protect themselves from the fluctuations in the world 
economy. 
The most productive sectors of manufacturing in Turkey are chemicals and engineering, whereas 
the least productive are textiles and clothing. Therefore, the shift that occurred after the 2008 
financial crisis from chemicals and engineering sectors towards textiles and clothing has led to a 
decline in average productivity in Turkey’s manufacturing. In other words, the 2008 crisis has 
intensified pressures on manufacturing wages because cost competitiveness achieved on the basis 
of depressing wages appears to have become the most effective short-term strategy for Turkish 
manufacturing. 
When the evolution of labour processes is examined within this global environment, it is 
understandable why one of the first policies of the AKP (the Justice and Development Party) 
government was to provide a legal and institutional basis for flexible labour markets.  
In its first year in office, 2003, the AKP government enacted, for example, a new Labour Law that 
promoted a new institutional structure. From the AKP government’s perspective, two objectives 
motivated the adoption of this new Law: 1) to bring more flexibility to the labour market and 2) to 
simultaneously enhance Turkey’s ability to implement in this field the relevant EU acquis (the body 
of common rights and obligations binding on EU member states).  
In this regard, the most significant characteristic of the Law was the introduction of the provisions 
on non-standard, atypical, flexible forms of employment, which were intended to be introduced 
mostly in line with the relevant EU legislation. In addition to favouring more flexible forms of 
employment, the Law also introduced more flexibility regarding the duration and organisation of 
working time.  
The enactment of the Law was the first step in introducing the new labour regime of the AKP 
government. Throughout the 2000s, as a part of the government’s supply-side economic strategy, 
there was an increasing use of labour market policies that were shaped by the European concepts 
of adaptability and employability. This change involved, in effect, shifting the burden of being 
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unemployed onto the employees rather than considering unemployment as a result of the 
structural problems embedded in labour markets.  
The post-2001 crisis adjustments in Turkey came at a very unique conjuncture of the global 
economy. First of all, while economic growth was rapid, it exhibited peculiar characteristics. As 
already outlined, growth was driven mainly by a massive inflow of foreign finance capital into 
Turkey, which was lured by relatively high domestic rates of interest. Hence, such inflows were 
primarily speculative in nature.  
But an important additional characteristic of the post-2001 era in Turkey—which has often been 
ignored—has been its poor job creation pattern. Credible rates of economic growth have been 
accompanied by high rates of unemployment and low participation rates in the labor market. For 
example, the rate of total unemployment rose to above 10% during 2002-2014 compared to its 
average during 1987-2001 of about 8%.  
This is an additional indictment of the accommodation to financialisation and the adoption of the 
correspondingly conducive economic and financial policies of successive Turkish governments. 
VII. Working Paper #144. “Assessing China’s Prospects within the 
Context of Global Imbalances”  
By T. McKinley 
 
Working Paper #144 (McKinley 2016) begins by focussing on the future economic and financial 
trends of the People’s Republic of China within the currently projected global context of slow 
economic growth and sizeable current-account imbalances. It then contrasts these projections 
with those generated by an alternative policy-generated scenario in which global imbalances in 
economic growth and current-account balances would be moderated. 
As the IMF has noted in its 2015-2016 World Economic Outlooks, global economic growth has 
noticeably slowed. Between October 2015 and July 2016, for example, the IMF’s periodic 
projections lowered such growth from 3.6% to 3.1%. But over the same period, there have been 
persistent disparities in current-account balances across the globe. While China and East Asian 
High-Income Countries (such as Japan) have maintained large current-account surpluses, other 
large economies, such as the USA and the United Kingdom, have suffered from large current-
account deficits. 
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Correspondingly, financial imbalances have also become an increasingly serious problem at the 
global level. The USA has had, for example, a large positive net external asset position while other 
sizeable economies, such as Brazil and Indonesia, have suffered from having a large negative net 
external asset position.  
But most importantly, as indicated in Working Paper #141 (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2015), 
countries such as Brazil have remained exposed to the vagaries of inherently unstable capital 
inflows, such as portfolio investment and net ‘other investment’. Portfolio investment usually 
refers to the purchases of shares and bonds. Net ‘other investment’ is a residual category that is 
dominated by flows of capital provided as loans or deposited into bank accounts. 
These two ‘inward’ flows of investment into a country’s economy are inherently unstable, since 
they would tend to quickly exit at the first hint of domestic economic problems. Hence, it is not 
merely a question of whether a country relies on an inward flow of investment capital, but also 
whether such an inward flow could easily change into a precipitous outflow. So the composition of 
such investment is also of paramount importance. 
I. Baseline Projections of Economic Growth and Current-Account 
Balances 
Working Paper #144 initiates its analysis of China by providing a Baseline Projection of future 
trends in GDP growth and current-account balances of major countries (including the USA and 
China) and blocs of countries (such as the EU). This projection assumes no important changes in 
policy and generates outcomes for the period 2017-2026. These projections are generated by the 
CAM global macro-econometric model. This is the same macro model that was used for Working 
Paper #141, “Financial Imbalances in the Global Economy: Consequences for Brazil and Indonesia”. 
GDP Growth 
These projections suggest that China’s economic growth would slow to an average of 6.5% over 
the ten-year period to 2026. This would be somewhat slower than its average rate of 7.1% 
recorded during 2012-2016, but the projected rate would still be relatively high. In contrast, the 
projection for GDP growth for the USA indicates that its economy would slow to the fairly low rate 
of 1.2%-1.3% over 2017-2026. 
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Economic growth in the European Union is also projected to be low, i.e., 1.2%, while growth in the 
important global bloc of East Asia High Income countries (mainly Japan and the Republic of Korea) 
would rise noticeably to 2.3%-2.4%. Mainly because of trends in China and the rest of East Asia, 
global economic growth would edge up to 2.5% by 2022-2026, the period towards the end of the 
model’s projection. 
Current-Account Balances 
The CAM projections for current-account balances across the globe suggest that there would 
continue to be large potentially destabilising disparities. China’s current-account surplus as a ratio 
to GDP would edge downward but would still be almost 4% by 2026. And in East Asian High-
Income Countries, the corresponding surplus would be 2.4%. 
In contrast, the current-account deficit of the USA would widen from -3.2% of GDP in 2016 to -
4.8% by 2026. While the EU as a whole is projected to have a small surplus, namely, 0.8% of GDP, 
by 2026, a disaggregated picture would be more worrying. For instance, Germany would produce a 
surplus of almost 5% of GDP while, in contrast, the United Kingdom would suffer from a deficit of 
almost -6%. 
II. An Alternative Policy Scenario to Address Global Imbalances 
In response to some of the adverse projections produced by the CAM’s Baseline (policy-neutral) 
Scenario, Working Paper #141 devises an Alternative Scenario based on progressive policy 
assumptions that could potentially mitigate future global imbalances in GDP growth and current 
accounts.  
For China, for example, these assumptions include an increase in consumption (corresponding to a 
reduction in savings) and a significant real appreciation of the Renminbi. For countries such as the 
USA, which are projected to have worsening current-account deficits, the policy assumptions 
include reductions in consumption and depreciation of their real exchange rates. 
GDP Growth 
Under the above assumptions, GDP growth in China is projected to slow to an average of 5.6% 
during 2022-2026. In contrast, GDP growth in the USA would rise to 2.0% during the same period.  
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The slowing in economic growth in China would be driven by both a secular decline in its 
investment rate and a narrowing of its current-account surplus, as the real appreciation of the 
Renminbi and the rise in its consumption would raise its imports while lowering its exports. 
Economic growth would also reach 3.1% in East Asian High Income countries during 2022-2026 (up 
from an average of 2.3% under the Baseline Scenario). Also, growth in the EU would edge up to 
1.5% (instead of 1.2%). 
Current-Account Balances 
China’s current-account balance would also narrow, dropping to an average surplus of only 1.8% of 
GDP during 2022-2026 (compared to an average of 3.9% under the Baseline Scenario). The 
current-account surplus of East Asia High-Income countries would also decline—to 1.8% of GDP 
compared to 2.4% under the Baseline Scenario. 
But the small current-account balance of the European Union would become even smaller, 
dropping to only 0.4% (compared to 0.8% under the Baseline Scenario). 
What is most troubling, however, is that while the large current-account deficit of the USA would 
decline, it would still be ominously high, i.e., remaining at an average of -4% of GDP during 2022-
2026. The projection for the United Kingdom would produce similar results: its current-account 
deficit would still be -4.7% of GDP by 20026. (This projection did not take into account the more 
recent vote for Brexit and the ensuing depreciation of the Pound). 
III. The Impact on China of Projected Changes in Financial Flows 
Working Paper #141 also examines the effects of Net Financial Flows into China under the 
assumptions of both the Baseline Scenario and the Alternative Policy Scenario.  
During the period 2000-2008 China’s large and rising holdings of foreign exchange reserves 
dominated its capital account. By 2008, for example, such reserves represented over 5% of GDP. 
These holdings declined to some extent from 2009 to 2015 but over the same period China’s 
holdings of Net Other Investment (such as through foreign lending) began to rise.  
Baseline Scenario 
The Baseline Scenario projects that China’s gross outflow of capital would be 4%-4.5% of GDP over 
2017-2026. This outflow would be driven mostly by the acquisition of foreign-exchange reserves 
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but it would be complemented by China’s foreign lending flows, which would amount to about 1% 
of GDP. 
Over the same projected period, the gross inflow of capital would hover around 1% of GDP, 
composed mostly of Foreign Direct Investment—supplemented, though to a very small degree, by 
inflows of portfolio investment. 
Hence, the Baseline Scenario (which assumes no major policy changes) projects that China would 
have a net financial outflow on its capital account amounting to 3%-3.5% of GDP during 2017-
2026—though this percentage would progressively decline to  a low of 3% by 2026. (Note that in 
this Working Paper capital outflows are designated, unconventionally, as positive items while 
inflows are designated as negative items). 
Hence, even under the Baseline Scenario China’s net capital account would remain fairly stable. On 
the one hand, the outflow of capital would be dominated by China’s acquisition of foreign 
exchange reserves and, on the other hand, its receipt of an inflow of capital would be dominated 
by Foreign Direct Investment. Hence, the net composition of capital flows into and out of China 
would likely remain fairly stable.  
Alternative Policy Scenario 
The Alternative Policy Scenario for 2017-2026 produces a somewhat different trend for China’s 
capital account but the basic dynamics and direction of change would remain. The trend of the Net 
Capital Account would be somewhat lower than that in the Baseline Scenario. From a level that is 
almost equivalent to 3% of GDP in 2017, it would progressively fall to under 2% by 2026. 
As in the Baseline Scenario, China’s holdings of foreign exchange reserves would still dominate its 
net capital account. While reaching a peak of about 4.7% of GDP in 2016, these reserves would 
progressively decline to 3.1% of GDP by 2026. 
The inflows of capital into China would still be dominated by Foreign Direct Investment over the 
period 2017-2026. But while these inflows would increase marginally over this 10-year period, they 
would not move much beyond 1% of GDP. And they would be supplemented, though only to a 
modest degree, by inflows of Net Other Investment, i.e., banking inflows or loans.  
Thus, unlike the net capital account position of a number of other major Emerging Economies, 
China is projected to maintain a fairly stable and positive net foreign investment position.  
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Its projected holdings of foreign exchange reserves, though reduced, would far outweigh, for 
example, its capital inflows. And such inflows would continue to be dominated by Foreign Direct 
Investment, which tends to be a more stable form of inward investment than either Portfolio 
Investment or Net Other Investment. It is these two latter forms of capital inflows (as well as 
outflows) that can have a destabilising impact on the net investment position of many other 
Emerging Economies—as documented in Working Paper #141 on Brazil and Indonesia. 
IV. Is China’s Rising Indebtedness Sustainable? 
The projections produced by the CAM macro-econometric model for Working Paper #141 have 
provided useful scenarios for analysing the likely future trajectory of China’s capital account. But 
data limitations have not allowed it to comprehensively assess historical trends and projections for 
China’s total debt, both external and domestic as well as public and private. 
Hence, the Working Paper has relied on various recent reports, such as from Moody’s, McKinsey 
and the IMF, to produce estimates of such debt. Generating such estimates has become a priority 
since China appeared to be shaken by financial instability in late 2015 and early 2016. Since China is 
now such a large economy, a threat to its financial stability could destabilise global financial flows. 
China’s level of debt is now a major area of concern. In May 2016 Moody’s estimated that its total 
debt had risen to 280% of GDP, a level that is higher than that of almost all other emerging or 
developing countries. But, within this total, China’s external debt has remained fairly small, i.e., no 
more than 9% of GDP in 2014, and China appears to have had few problems in servicing it.  
The debt of China’s central government in 2015 was only about 17% of GDP, a very manageable 
level. But when all types of China’s local government debt are included, the estimate of total public 
debt rises to about 60%. 
Household debt is not estimated to be large: it is less than 40% of GDP and most of it is based on 
house mortgages. At the same time Chinese households have a fairly high savings rate so the 
probability of defaulting on such mortgages is not high. 
Working Paper #141 finds that the most troubling form of debt in China appears to be corporate 
debt. Informal estimates by the IMF suggest that this form of debt could represent about 160% of 
GDP. But most of this corporate debt is owed by state-owned enterprises, which are backed up by 
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the government, and it has been financed by domestic bank loans or bonds, not foreign sources of 
finance.  
Although much of China’s debt, both public and private, appears to be manageable, it is still true 
that its total debt, as a ratio to GDP, has risen rapidly since the onset of the global financial crisis in 
2008. Rough estimates claim, for example, that this ratio shot up from about 170% of GDP to 
280% between 2008 and 2016. 
Particularly worrying is that the number of non-performing loans in China’s corporate sector and 
local governments does not appear to be negligible. For example, the IMF has claimed recently 
that about 15% of bank loans to Chinese corporations are at risk of not being repaid and it has 
publically warned about the rising problem of corporate debt. Also, a significant number of local 
governments do not appear to have the revenue sources that would enable them to repay their 
substantial public debts.  
There still appear to be sufficient assets of governments and households to enable them to 
effectively manage their levels of debt. Moreover, China is likely to continue having a very large 
stockpile of foreign exchange reserves that it could mobilize to meet any external debt obligations.  
China’s government also continues to have significant influence over the financial activities of 
state-owned enterprises—as well as state-owned banks. Moreover, China’s capital account has not 
been completely liberalised. In fact, capital controls were tightened in 2015 as private capital 
outflows began to increase.  
In sum, Working Paper #141 concludes that although China’s total indebtedness is rising, it 
appears, for the time being, to remain manageable. Both its high savings rate and the ample fiscal 
space of its central government could be used to guard against financial instability. In addition, its 
strong positive net external asset position could potentially be mobilized if its financial 
indebtedness (mainly by its ‘private’ corporations and local governments) began to reach 
unsustainable levels.  
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VIII. Summary of Main Points 
India 
The economic and financial trends in India reported by Working Paper #145 differ in some 
important respects from those reported by the working papers for most of the other major 
Emerging Economies covered by Deliverable 6.07. Financialisation, both in its internal and external 
forms, appears to be at a much earlier stage of development in India. Moreover, its economy is 
projected to continue growing at a fairly healthy rate over the medium term. 
Yet this Working Paper raises some major concerns about the country’s future prospects. For 
example, it warns that if current trends of financialisation continue, India’s rate of economic 
growth could be significantly slowed by the reliance of the economy on investment in the financial 
sector instead of investment in the productive sector, especially manufacturing. 
At the global level India is still a very minor player in financial markets. The country’s share of 
external financial assets is projected, for example, to rise to only 1% of the global total by 2030. Yet 
if it continues to run sizeable current-account deficits, its net external liabilities will surely increase. 
In addition, the share of short-term portfolio liabilities in its total external liabilities is projected to 
increase by 2030 to over 30%—a share that would be much higher than that for China, for instance. 
Credit as a proportion of gross capital formation in India had already risen to 200% by 2012 but one 
of the central arguments of the Working Paper is that much of this credit has been utilised for 
financial investments and inventory stock-piling instead of fixed productive assets.  
As a result, economic growth has responded less than proportionately to increases in credit. 
Worryingly, the rate of return on financial investment is also likely to be higher than that for 
productive investment. Also, the build-up of inventories is likely to be a barometer of ‘over-
production’, corresponding to a secular deficiency in domestic aggregate demand. 
In view of these concerns, the Working Paper utilises the CAM global model in order to test the 
usefulness of an alternative policy scenario in which India’s economy would be boosted by an 
expansion of domestic demand and a concerted export push. The main levers are an assumed 
increase in private investment and, to a lesser degree, an increase in foreign direct investment 
(which is assumed to be more productively oriented than other forms of foreign investment).  
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Because India is projected to continue being plagued by current-account deficits, this alternative 
scenario also assumes a depreciation of India’s real exchange rate and an increase in its exports of 
manufactured goods. 
But the scenario’s concomitant projected greater opening of India’s capital account to foreign 
investment would lead to a sharp increase in short-term unstable inward portfolio investment, 
which would rise to about one-third of the country’s external financial liabilities by 2030. 
Hence, while India’s Net External Asset Position was still a positive 15% of GDP in 2015 (in contrast, 
for example, to the large negative positions of both Brazil and Indonesia), its move towards greater 
external financial liberalisation would likely heighten its future vulnerability to the instability of 
international financial flows. 
Brazil and Indonesia 
Working Paper #141 focuses on two major Emerging Economies, Brazil and Indonesia, in which 
unstable international financial flows have been a major recent concern. Both of them are 
vulnerable to such instability because they have highly negative Net External Asset Positions. Such 
positions imply that the financial assets held by foreigners in these two countries are far larger 
than the financial assets owned abroad by their own citizens (or governments). 
If the corresponding inward flows of capital by foreigners were used for long-term productive 
investment, such an imbalance would not necessarily be a matter of grave concern. Such could 
conceivably be the case, for example, for some forms of Foreign Direct Investment. But the two 
other categories of cross-border investment, portfolio investment and the residual category 
labelled ‘other investment’, tend to be short-term and often highly unstable.  
When the financial rates of return for such short-term investment decline in countries such as 
Brazil and Indonesia, this capital is prone to quickly flee the country. This dynamic represents one 
of the most counter-productive aspects of the increased financialisation of such Emerging 
Economies.  
When such rising economies are growing, they will tend to attract larger inflows of unstable capital 
because the rates of return on such investment would be higher than in Developed Economies. But 
when the economic growth of such Emerging Economies begins to falter—as has happened 
recently—this capital quickly floods back into global financial ‘safe havens’, such as US treasuries. 
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Working Paper #141 is particularly useful because it is able to place such financial flows within a 
global economic context through the use of the CAM global macro-econometric model. This 
model is particularly useful for making future projections based on long-term historical trends.  
In fact, this working paper was revised in mid-2016 in light of dramatic changes in the global 
context that occurred in late 2015 and early 2016. These changes were taken into account by the 
CAM model when it was used to generate more up-to-date projections. 
The general significance of the CAM’s resultant 10-year projections (from 2017 to 2026) is that the 
global economy is likely to be plagued by persistently slow GDP growth and continuing stark 
economic imbalances, especially current-account imbalances. Such a context implies that there 
would continue to be re-occurring financial imbalances, marked by unstable capital flows between 
countries, particularly between Emerging Economies and leading Developed Economies. 
Under the CAM scenario, Brazil is projected to eventually recover from its current sharp recession 
and grow at a moderate rate, namely 2%-2.5% through 2026. The country’s current account would 
eventually regain its previous surplus position but, importantly, its rate of domestic investment 
would remain stubbornly low. 
The composition of capital flows into and out of Brazil would also remain disadvantageous. Very 
little foreign direct investment would flow into the country while inflows of unstable portfolio 
investment would predominate. In addition, the government would have limited ability to 
counteract the effect of any rapid outflow of financial capital because it would hold a relatively 
small stock of foreign exchange reserves. 
In some ways, Indonesia is projected to be in a somewhat stronger economic position than Brazil 
over the next ten years. By 2019 it is projected, for example, to begin maintaining a GDP growth 
rate of about 4%. Though its investment rate would tend to decline over the projected period, it 
would still remain at about 24% of GDP, far higher than Brazil’s, for example. 
However, Indonesia’s current account would maintain a significant deficit throughout the 
projected period. Financial flows into Indonesia are projected by the CAM to decline from their 
current levels but then recover modestly by 2020. Most troubling, however, is that financial inflows 
would continue to be dominated by portfolio investment and ‘other investment’, the two most 
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unstable forms of capital inflows. And, as would be the case in Brazil, the government of Indonesia 
would command only a relatively small stockpile of foreign exchange reserves as a safeguard. 
So both Brazil and Indonesia are projected to recover economically, to some extent, from the 
instabilities that they confronted in 2015-2016. But, on the whole, these recoveries would not be 
strong. Moreover, their financial fragilities would remain daunting, both because their Net Foreign 
Asset Positions would remain stubbornly negative and any continuing inflows of financial capital 
would be dominated by the most unstable varieties. So their financial positions are likely to much 
more unstable that India’s. 
Brazil 
Working Paper #146 is a valuable contribution to Work Package #6 because it concentrates on the 
national and international consequences of the complex dynamics of financialisation in Brazil. 
Thus, compared to Working Paper #141, it goes into much more depth on such issues and is able 
thereby to draw out several important implications. 
The authors’ paramount point is that the process of financialisation in Emerging Economies such 
as Brazil is shaped fundamentally by their integration into an international monetary and financial 
system and this integration places them in a ‘subordinated and disadvantaged’ economic position. 
The authors are concerned in particular about two “major channels of transmission” that integrate 
countries such as Brazil into the international financial system as well as decisively influence the 
nature of their domestic system of financialisation. The first channel is the obligatory accumulation 
by their governments of foreign exchange reserves and the second channel is their inevitable 
vulnerability to large and sudden movements of financial capital, which can heavily influence their 
exchange rates—even though such movements can be largely independent of trends in their 
domestic economic conditions. 
At the level of the domestic economy, central banks in Emerging Economies have increasingly had 
to rely on ‘sterilizing’ the impact of new sizeable inflows of foreign capital. In doing so, they have 
used ‘repurchase agreements’ with domestic banks. This process has involved the exchange by 
central banks of domestic public debt securities with domestic banks in order to mop up the 
latters’ excessive bank reserves. 
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But the banks have then perversely used such newly acquired public assets (the debt securities) as 
a basis to extend more private loans to finance either domestic household consumption or 
mortgages for housing. In the process, the households sector has become more ‘financialised’ 
while the banks have de-emphasized longer-term lending for domestic productive sectors. 
At the international level, an Emerging Economy such as Brazil is still at a strategic disadvantage 
because it has to offer relatively high rates of return in order to attract international investor 
interest in its financial assets. It is also hindered by the fact that it faces major difficulties in issuing 
international debt instruments denominated in its own currency because of the ensuing 
‘exchange-rate risk’ that international investors would argue that they will confront.  
Moreover, the higher interest rates that Brazil is offering for international investors tend to have a 
knock-on effect on depressing the country’s ability to promote domestic productive investment. 
Hence, Brazil’s ability to independently establish the values of both its own exchange rate and its 
own interest rate is severely constrained. 
In examining trends in Brazil itself, the authors draw out some interesting conclusions about the 
general impact of financialisation. Their first claim is that financialisation tends to lead to the 
incorporation of households into predatory credit relations. Their second point is that there is an 
increased reliance by banks on fees and income from financial trading, rather than from long-term 
lending for productive investment. 
Moreover, the authors claim that banks have become increasingly reliant on funding from financial 
markets rather than from the normal acquisition of deposits. Lastly, they assert that non-financial 
corporations have also become increasingly reliant on financial markets for their funding. These 
phenomena appear to be common trends across many of the major Emerging Economies. 
In addition, there is the inevitable accompanying increase in the array of financial investors in 
domestic firms, ranging from pension and insurance funds to exchange-traded funds and macro 
hedge funds. Thus, when there is even only a relatively small change in the sentiment of such 
investors and, as a consequence, they make only small individual changes in their portfolio of 
assets, there can still be major aggregate adverse repercussions on the entire economy of a 
country. 
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The authors of Working Paper #146 conclude that all of the above effects have tended to 
contribute to slower growth and greater financial instability in Emerging Economies such as Brazil 
as well as reinforce their subordinate and unstable position within an increasingly powerful global 
financial system. Many of these points appear relevant for most of the other Emerging Economies. 
South Africa 
Working Paper #142 focused on the post-apartheid impact of financialisation on the South African 
economy. Since the landmark year 1994, the South African financial sector has increased, in fact, 
much faster than the economy as a whole.  
But this trend has spawned a common secular process in which the rising acquisition of financial 
assets has coincided with a decline in gross capital formation. Financialisation has also deeply 
affected South African households, primarily through increased lending for mortgages and 
consumption. As a result, the economy had to confront by the 2000s a large real-estate bubble and 
an unsustainable consumption boom. This boom was fuelled, for the most part, by the large influx 
of short-term speculative foreign capital. Such a trend has been common across Emerging 
Economies. 
Moreover, this process has led households to become indebted well beyond their means of 
income, thereby increasing the likelihood of periodic financial instabilities and crises. Once net 
savers in the South African economy, households have now become persistent net debtors. 
The Working Paper argues that South Africa has become more financially open than most other 
comparable middle-income countries. Thus, similar to what has happened in other major 
Emerging Economies (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey), the country has had to confront periodic 
financial crises, abrupt reversals of international capital flows, persistent volatility of its exchange 
rate, an unproductive domestic allocation of capital and persistent economic inequalities. 
Such financial instability has led to substantial outflows of South Africa’s own financial capital. The 
Working Paper reports, for example, that 37% of all reported South African assets were held 
abroad in 2014. Additionally, since 2000 onwards, the government has had to hold, as a defensive 
measure, a large stockpile of foreign exchange reserves—which bear the strategic disadvantage of 
being low-interest bearing assets. In addition, there has been a persistent rise in the outflows of 
dividends and interest payments to foreign investors. 
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In addition, inward financial investment into South Africa has increasingly been dominated by 
short-term volatile assets, especially portfolio investments. Since such inflows require relatively 
high domestic rates of return, portfolio investment is still likely to rapidly flee the country during 
any short-term economic or financial difficulties. 
The Working Paper points out that South Africa has been afflicted by the rapid rise in the number 
of institutional investors in its economy. This has become a problem because their investment 
horizon is usually short-term and obsessed with financial-market metrics of success. As a result, 
real fixed investment and consequently economic growth has tended to suffer. The share of 
operating profits of non-financial corporations in South Africa has declined, for example, because 
they have been obliged to make constant and debilitating dividend pay-outs to a legion of such 
institutional investors. 
Lastly and distinctively, the Working Paper argues that there has been a close correlation in South 
Africa between rising financialisation and increasing inequality—of both income and wealth. This 
correlation has been attributed to financial instability and resultant slow economic growth, the 
notable lack of productive investment, persistently high unemployment, the decline of the wage 
share in total personal income and the deterioration in labour’s bargaining power over pay and 
working conditions.  
Turkey 
Working Paper #143 provides a comprehensive account of Turkey’s recent economic and financial 
development and the effects of international capital flows on the country. Turkey’s development 
trajectory has been different from other major Emerging Economies because of its lengthy, and 
incomplete, process of accession to the European Union. 
The country first adopted capital-account liberalisation in 1989 and the ensuing instability of 
capital inflows and outflows led thereafter to financial instability, particularly deep crises in 1994 
and 2001. In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, Turkey also experienced a deep recession 
in 2009. 
The Working Paper argues that, in effect, the country has become trapped in persistent current-
account deficits that have to be covered by a constant inflow of financial capital. And the 
instabilities inherent in such capital inflows have, in turn, led to both lower and more volatile 
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economic growth. In this respect Turkey’s conditions appear to be worse than those of many other 
Emerging Economies. 
Turkey’s economic development has been complicated by its relations with both the European 
Union and the Bretton Woods institutions. For example, the introduction of the EU Commission’s 
Accession Partnership for Turkey coincided with the country’s required implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes promoted by the IMF and the World Bank. However, despite adopting 
such policies, the accession of Turkey to the EU has turned out to be a very lengthy, ‘open-ended’ 
and politically frustrating process. 
In the wake of its 2001 economic crisis, Turkey was obliged, nevertheless, to adopt many ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’ economic policies. These included inflation-targeting, strict fiscal 
discipline, free-floating exchange rates and open capital accounts, as well as a greater emphasis on 
privatisation and reduced regulation of the labour market. 
But the Working Paper argues that, as a result, Turkey’s economy has been forced into a ‘debt-led 
growth regime’. Ever since the 2001 crisis, the country’s current account has been in deficit and 
this has necessitated constant international financing. Hence, the country has become endemically 
dependent on a persistent inflow of finance capital.  
Moreover, Turkey has suffered from a relatively low rate of domestic savings, which has only 
served to intensify its reliance on foreign capital. Because of significant capital inflows, the 
economy has suffered from an appreciated exchange rate and the government has also been 
obliged to maintain relatively high real interest rates in order to continue attracting such foreign 
capital. 
One of the strategic outcomes has been a process of de-industrialisation as the country has been 
obliged to rely heavily on low-value added export products. In order to maintain any international 
competitiveness in the face of an appreciated exchange rate, Turkey has increasingly relied on 
lowering labour costs. This has involved promoting much more flexible labour markets and has 
ended up maintaining a relatively high rate of unemployment. 
Related to capital inflows, the size of Turkey’s private-sector debt started to eclipse public-sector 
debt by the mid-2000s. Under structural adjustment, the government had been aggressively 
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cutting public expenditures, introducing new taxes and beginning to run primary budget surpluses. 
Thus, public debt as a ratio to GDP began to decline.  
But over the same period the debt stock of non-financial corporations and households began to 
soar. Thus, Turkey’s economic growth became more reliant on the domestic private sector’s ability 
(particularly that of non-financial corporations) to borrow, especially from abroad.  
In fact, the financial net worth of non-financial corporations has been much more negative than 
that of any other major category of the Turkish economy (namely, between -90% and -120% of 
GDP). And Turkey’s net worth vis-à-vis the Rest of the World has become persistently negative. 
Working Paper #143 makes a particularly valuable contribution to FESSUD Work Package #6 in its 
analysis of the monetary policies of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (the CBRT). 
Although the CBRT adopted inflation-targeting in the early 2000s, the erratic effect of 
international capital flows on Turkey’s economy meant that this policy proved to be relatively 
ineffective. Fortunately, the accompanying appreciation of the Turkish Lira, as a result of capital 
inflows, helped contain inflation.  
But, at the same time, appreciation has relentlessly widened the country’s current-account 
deficits. Hence, the country has had to continuously attract a massive inflow of financial capital 
(averaging about 8% of GDP per year) in order to finance such deficits.  
Unfortunately, since 2010 short-term, inherently unstable financial inflows (such as portfolio 
investment) have increased relative to long-term financial inflows (such as foreign direct 
investment). And the increasing influence of unstable financial inflows has also led to extreme 
volatility in Turkey’s exchange rate.  
But the central bank of Turkey has been unable to stabilise the Lira because flows of capital into 
and out of the country have been largely determined by the global appetite for risk rather than 
domestic economic trends. And the parameters for such risk are mainly determined by leading 
developed-country central banks, particularly the US Federal Reserve or European Central Bank. 
This is similar to the point made by the other Working Papers about conditions in Emerging 
Economies. 
 
 
55 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
Hence, the Central Bank of Turkey (like central banks in other major Emerging Economies) has 
very limited policy independence. It has been continuously and unfavourably obliged to align 
changes in its policy interest rate with those instituted by the Fed or the ECB. 
China 
Working Paper #144 is a valuable contribution to FESSUD Deliverable 6.10 because it attempts to 
place China’s increasing financialisation within the context of a global economy that is slowing and 
continuing to exhibit wide disparities in current account balances (and accompanying instabilities 
in capital accounts). For example, the paper uses the CAM global macro-econometric model to 
project China’s future economic and financial trends over the next ten years within the context of 
the evolution of the global economy.  
Under the assumptions of a Baseline Scenario (which assumes no significant changes in policy), the 
CAM model projects, for example, that China would continue to grow fairly rapidly but it would 
also continue contributing significantly to global imbalances in current accounts, and thus 
associated major imbalances in capital accounts, i.e., international financial flows.  
Also, while China would continue enjoying sizeable current-account surpluses, Developed 
Economies such as the USA and the United Kingdom (two leading global financial centres) would 
continue, by contrast, to suffer from large current-account deficits. 
Hence, the author of Working Paper #144 constructs an Alternative Policy Scenario that could 
slow China’s economic growth, change its pattern and narrow the country’s current-account 
surplus. This scenario is based, for example, on assuming an increase in China’s level of 
consumption (and a corresponding reduction in its savings rate) and an appreciation of its 
exchange rate. 
As a result of such policy-related assumptions, China’s rate of economic growth would slow 
significantly and its current-account surplus would narrow. But this adjustment of China’s future 
path, as well as the effect of the Alternative Policy Scenario as a whole, would not be successful in 
helping to significantly lower the large current-account deficits of the USA and the UK.  
What is also noteworthy is that the CAM projections suggest that China is likely to continue 
enjoying economic outcomes that would be superior to those of other Emerging Economies, such 
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as Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey, all of which have been surveyed by Working Papers 
in this FESSUD Deliverable.  
The external financialisation of China would also likely be much more sustainable than that of 
other Emerging Economies. For example, under both the Baseline Scenario and the Alternative 
Policy Scenario, China would maintain a fairly stable position with regard to inward and outward 
financial flows.  
It would continue to amass a sizeable external stockpile of foreign-exchange reserves while the 
inward flows of capital into its economy would continue to be dominated by Foreign Direct 
Investment instead of the more volatile and erratic flows of Portfolio Investment and Other 
Investment. 
Working Paper #144 also examines the external and internal debt dynamics of China, which have 
become a major area of concern for analysts since the outbreaks of financial instability in the 
country in late 2015 and early 2016. But the paper concludes that although China’s total debt, 
comprising both external and domestic, has risen sharply in recent years, it is likely to remain 
sustainable. In fact, its external debt remains fairly small. Moreover, the country continues to 
amass a large strategic stockpile of foreign exchange reserves and it maintains fairly effective 
capital controls, both of which would help to mitigate any financial difficulties. 
The main areas of strategic weakness in China appear to be the domestic debts of local 
governments and the corporate sector. In contrast, the debts of the national government and 
households are not large. Moreover, China continues to have a fairly high household savings rate 
and the national government appears to maintain adequate fiscal space and retains the ability to 
exert significant influence over the financing of state-owned enterprises.  
Hence, although many analysts in advanced capitalist economies and even international financial 
institutions such as the IMF and BIS  have recently raised serious concerns about the process of 
financialisation in China, the country’s future course still appears to be economically sustainable.  
In this regard, conditions in China would likely continue to contrast with those projected for the 
other major Emerging Economies of Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey, all of which have 
been reviewed in this Synthesis Report. The one exception appears to be India, although this 
country appears to be at a much lower level of financial development.  
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Financialisation, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development (FESSUD) is a 10 million euro 
project largely funded by a near 8 million euro grant from the European Commission under 
Framework Programme 7 (contract number : 266800). The University of Leeds is the lead co-
ordinator for the research project with a budget of over 2 million euros. 
 
THE ABSTRACT OF THE PROJECT IS: 
The research programme will integrate diverse levels, methods and disciplinary traditions with the 
aim of developing a comprehensive policy agenda for changing the role of the financial system to 
help achieve a future which is sustainable in environmental, social and economic terms. The 
programme involves an integrated and balanced consortium involving partners from 14 countries 
that has unsurpassed experience of deploying diverse perspectives both within economics and 
across disciplines inclusive of economics. The programme is distinctively pluralistic, and aims to 
forge alliances across the social sciences, so as to understand how finance can better serve 
economic, social and environmental needs. The central issues addressed are the ways in which the 
growth and performance of economies in the last 30 years have been dependent on the 
characteristics of the processes of financialisation; how has financialisation impacted on the 
achievement of specific economic, social, and environmental objectives?; the nature of the 
relationship between financialisation and the sustainability of the financial system, economic 
development and the environment?; the lessons to be drawn from the crisis about the nature and 
impacts of financialisation? ; what are the requisites of a financial system able to support a process 
of sustainable development, broadly conceived?’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
59 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
 
THE PARTNERS IN THE CONSORTIUM ARE: 
 
Participant Number Participant organisation name Country 
1 (Coordinator) University of Leeds UK 
2 University of Siena Italy 
3 School of Oriental and African Studies UK 
4 Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques France 
5 Pour la Solidarité, Brussels Belgium 
6 Poznan University of Economics Poland 
7 Tallin University of Technology Estonia 
8 Berlin School of Economics and Law Germany 
9 Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra Portugal 
10 University of Pannonia, Veszprem Hungary 
11 National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Greece 
12 Middle East Technical University, Ankara Turkey 
13 Lund University Sweden 
14 University of Witwatersrand South Africa 
15 University of the Basque Country, Bilbao Spain 
 
 
The views expressed during the execution of the FESSUD project, in whatever form and or by 
whatever medium, are the sole responsibility of the authors. The European Union is not liable for 
any use that may be made of the information contained therein. 
 
Published in Leeds, U.K. on behalf of the FESSUD project. 
 
 
 
60 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
 
